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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Appeal is from a final Order (Summary Judgment) of
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
(Honorable Ronald E. Nehring).

Linda Ilott, the plaintiff-

appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j).

The Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), "'poured"'
this Appeal "over" to this Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The sole issue presented by this Appeal is the following:
whether the District Court committed reversible error when it
determined, in the face of the facts and procedural history of
this case, that this is, by its nature and despite Ms. Ilott's
never pursuing such a theory, a "failure-to-inspect" or
"inadequate or negligent inspection" case, and only such a
case, and that the University of Utah is thus immune, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(4), from suit by Ms. Ilott.
(STANDARD OF REVIEW)
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and only if the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The appellate

court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for
1

correctness.

E.g.,

(Utah 1993).

The appellate court does not defer to the trial

Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 918

court's ruling on appeal of a grant of summary judgment.
E.g.,

Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah

App. 1993).

On review of a grant of summary judgment, the

appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.

Id.
(ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT)

This issue was preserved in the District Court by
Ms. Ilott's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. at 101-83) and at oral argument,
presented May 18, 1999, in opposition to that Motion.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
This Appeal, in this personal injury lawsuit, is from a

summary judgment that was entered pursuant to the District
Court's determination that this case arises from a failure to
make an inspection or the making of an inadequate or negligent
inspection and that the University of Utah (the defendantappellee) is, thus, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(4),
immune from suit by Ms. Ilott.
2

Ms. Ilott alleged, in her Complaint (R. at 1-11), that
the University negligently breached its duty to Ms. Ilott, a
paying customer and business invitee who was attending a
football game at the University's football stadium on
October 29, 1994, by, among other things, failing to make and
keep the subject property safe, non-dangerous, and nondefective, and that Ms. Ilott sustained substantial
compensable damages, special and general, by reason of that
negligence.

Ms. Ilott did not allege or pursue a claim that

the University had negligently failed to inspect or had
negligently or inadequately inspected the subject premises.
The University filed a motion for summary judgment and
supporting memorandum (R. at 35-81), contending that the
subject condition (a rotten or otherwise worn-out bleacher
plank that broke under Ms. Ilott's weight) constituted a nonactionable latent defect and, alternatively, that, by its
nature, this was a "failure to inspect" or "negligent or
inadequate inspection" case.
That motion was vigorously contested by Ms. Ilott, in her
memorandum in opposition (R. at 101-83) and during oral
argument.

The District Court took the matter under advisement

and ultimately determined, in its Memorandum Decision (R. at
210-20; copy appearing in Addendum), that this case is, by its
3

nature, a negligent or inadequate inspection or failure-toinspect case and that the University is thus immune from suit
by Ms. Ilott.

The District Court on August 23, 1999 entered

its formal Order (R. at 221-22) granting the University's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Ms. Ilott's Notice of Appeal (R.

at 223-24) was filed September 2, 1999.
On or about October 1, 1999, Ms. Ilott filed, pursuant to
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, her Motion
for Summary Disposition (reversal, on the basis of manifest
error).

The Utah Supreme Court, by its Order dated

October 20, 1999, deferred ruling on that motion until further
consideration.
By its Order (R. at 231) dated December 1, 1999, the Utah
Supreme Court transferred this Appeal to this Court.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Ilott stepped on a worn-out plank that, along with

two other planks, comprised a bleacher seat at the University
of Utah football stadium.

The plank broke under her weight

and she sustained significant knee and other leg injuries in
the incident.

R. at 2-3.

The University had knowledge of the general problem (old
wooden bleachers rotting and deteriorating, over time, to the

4

point of failure).

E.g.,

Deposition of Mark Jolly, at 27 (R.

at 157); Deposition of Elwin John, at 21 (R. at 177).
The wood used for the bleachers is untreated, and
University crew member employees acknowledged that breakage
was due to rot in the wood and/or normal wear and tear.

Jolly

depo., at 27 (R. at 157); John depo., at 21 (R. at 177).
The bleachers broke or otherwise needed to be replaced in
all areas of the stadium.

The University's Gary Ratliff

testified, "x[w]e saw no pattern.
the planks broke or anything."

No rhyme or reason for where
Deposition of Gary Ratliff, at

39 (R. at 137).
The University came forward with no evidence to suggest
that any of the metal bleachers in place at the stadium had
ever broken, and the only University employees (the people who
did the stadium bleacher inspection and replacement work)
asked about that subject denied knowledge of any such problems
with any metal bleachers.
177).

E.g., John depo., at 21 (R. at

Not as a "post-incident remedial measure," but in

conjunction with and as part of the stadium's overall
renovation, the stadium now has all metal bleachers.

E.g.,

Deposition of Steve Pyne at 21 (R. at 124).
Every year, at the beginning of each season, University
employees would walk the bleachers and look at the bleachers
5

and determine, by visual observation and weight testing, which
bleachers or parts thereof needed to be replaced.

E.g.,

Aff.

of Gary Ratliff, para. 1 (R. at 83). Many wooden planks were
replaced at the beginning of every reason.
at 21-22 (R. at 156).

E.g.,

Jolly depo.

So many bad planks were found that

contests were held, on a daily basis, and the University
employee who broke the fewest planks by walking on them had to
buy pizza for his bleacher-busting colleagues.

Depo. of Gary

Ratliff, 37-38 (R. at 135-36).
It is a common occurrence for spectators at games or
other events to walk on the wooden bleachers at the stadium.
The University's Jeffery Thomas testified:
QUESTION: Have you seen people during football games walk
on bleachers, wooden bleachers?
ANSWER:
Yes, I have.
QUESTION: Is that something that you've seen every time,
every game?
ANSWER:
Yes.
QUESTION: People by the numbers doing that?
ANSWER:
What's that, again?
QUESTION: Lots of people doing that?
ANSWER:
Yes.
Thomas depo,., at 22 (R. at 153).

See, also, deposition of

Clifford Garland, at 28 (R. at 172).
Despite the knowledge that spectators routinely, and as a
matter of course, walked on the old wooden bleachers, the
University did not warn spectators of the risks of walking on
6

the bleachers, by announcement, by signs, or otherwise.
Mr. Thomas testified as follows:
QUESTION: Have you ever seen any signs up at the football
stadium telling people not to do that [walk on
bleachers]?
ANSWER:
No.
QUESTION: Have you ever heard anything over the
loudspeaker at football games telling people
not to do that?
ANSWER:
No.
Thomas depo., at 22 (R. at 153).

See, also, John depo., at

22-23 (R. at 178-79).
The University does warn spectators not to walk on the
seats in events in the Huntsman Center (another University
facility, one used for basketball games) due to concerns that
the seats might break.
IV.

John depo., at 23 (R. at 179).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The primary focus of Ms. Ilott's claim has been and
remains that the University breached its duty of care to
Ms. Ilott by failing to keep the subject premises reasonably
safe, by allowing the subject premises to be unreasonably
unsafe, dangerous, and defective, and by, among other things,
allowing bleacher seats, one of which gave way under
Ms. Ilott's weight, to be and remain in a rotted or otherwise
deteriorating condition.

The contentions advanced by

Ms. Ilott have primarily to do with the proposition that, as
7

results of the University's knowledge of the generally
deteriorating condition of the bleachers, replacing numerous
of the old and -- by age and weathering -- deteriorated planks
on only an ad hoc basis was an unsatisfactory and negligent
response.
The University convinced the District Court that this
case dealt with something it did not -- a contention that the
inspections themselves were inadequate or negligent.

It has

never been the inspections or the inspection process of which
Ms. Ilott has complained but, rather, the University's failure
physically to address the general condition (as it now has,
subsequent to the subject incident, by installing metal
bleachers throughout the stadium) and/or satisfactorily to
warn people not to walk on the old wooden bleacher seats.
This Court should recognize and act on the general
proposition of law that parties ought to be allowed to pursue
claims of their choosing and not have them contorted into
something they are not.

This Court should reverse the

District Court's characterization of Ms. Ilott's claims as
"failure to inspect or inadequate or negligent inspection" and
its concomitant granting, on governmental immunity grounds, of
the University's Motion for Summary Judgment.

8

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

MS. ILOTT'S INJURIES ARISE OUT OF "A DANGEROUS OR
DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF ANY PUBLIC BUILDING, STRUCTURE ...
OR OTHER PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT'7 AND NOT OUT OF A FAILURE TO
MAKE AN INSPECTION OR THE MAKING OF AN INADEQUATE OR
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION."
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 provides:
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the
exceptions to waiver set forth in §63-30-10, immunity
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any
injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of
any public building, structure ... or other public
improvement.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 provides, in pertinent part:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(4)

A failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;

As Ms. Ilott sought to explain to the District Court, and
as is clear from her Complaint, she has never advanced a claim
of failure-to-inspect or of negligent or inadequate
inspection.

The essential paragraphs of her Complaint (R. at

1-11) are, for purposes pertinent hereto, the following:
4.

On October 29, 1994, and continuously, for a
substantial period of time prior thereto, defendant
owned, leased, possessed, and/or controlled, and had
the duty to maintain and keep safe, non-dangerous,
and non-defective certain real property ("the
subject premises") located, on information and
9

belief, on the University of Utah campus and
commonly known as the University of Utah Stadium and
Rice Stadium.
5.

On October 29, 1994, plaintiff was an invitee of
defendant and was a person to whom defendant owed
the duty of reasonable care, including the duty to
keep the subject premises safe and well-maintained
and not dangerous, defective, or unsafe.

6.

Defendant, on and prior to October 29, 1994, by and
through one or more of its agents, breached its duty
of care to plaintiff by failing to keep the subject
premises safe, by allowing the subject premises to
be unsafe, dangerous, and defective, and by, among
other things,1 and with actual or constructive notice
of that condition, allowing a "bleacher" seat to be
and remain in a rotted or otherwise deteriorated
condition.

A review of that language and the entirety of the
Complaint will make it clear that Ms. Ilott's claim fits the
§63-30-9 "dangerous or defective condition" concept and has
nothing to do with a supposedly inadequate or negligent
inspection.

The fact that the University, through its

employees, inspected the bleacher seats does not detract from
the accuracy of the proposition that this is not an inspection
case.
If the mere fact that a governmental entity has conducted
an inspection of its own unsafe property could, ipso

1

facto,

Ms Ilott also contends that the University's duty of care included the
duty to warn her and the other patrons of the stadium of the danger
inherent in walking on the old wooden bleachers, and that the University
abjectly breached that aspect of its duty of care

10

turn every tort case claiming that government property is
defective or dangerous into a negligent inspection case,
virtually no claim, regardless of its strength, regarding a
dangerous or defective condition of a public building or other
public improvement or, for that matter, of a public highway,
tunnel, bridge, etc. (see Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9) could hope
to succeed.

For, to one degree or another, and with varying

degrees of frequency, all such things are "inspected."
Ms. Ilott urges the Court to recognize that it cannot, in
light of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 and §63-30-9, be the law of
Utah that a person who is injured by reason of a dangerous
public building or highway can be checkmated in her effort to
obtain compensation by the governmental entity's simply making
the argument that the plaintiff s claim is necessarily one of
negligent inspection.

Otherwise, and by reason of the fact

that governmental entities always conduct some manner of
"inspection" of their own properties, the presumptive waiver
of immunity that is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-8 and
63-30-9 would be rendered essentially meaningless.

And, as

numerous Utah appellate decisions have explained, related
statutes such as those comprising the Utah governmental
immunity act need to be construed in a fashion that harmonizes
the statutes and renders none meaningless.
11

E.g.,

Lyon v.

Burton, 2000 Utah 19, 1 17; Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643,
644 (Utah 1993).
The Court should determine that this case is not a
negligent inspection case and should reverse the District
Court's ruling.
B.

SECTION 63-30-10(4) "APPLIES ONLY TO CONCLUSIONS AND
RESULTS OF AN INSPECTION WHERE THE INSPECTOR MAY HAVE
OVERLOOKED SOMETHING OR MADE A FAULTY JUDGMENT IN
DECIDING WHETHER TO APPROVE OR REJECT THE SUBJECT OF THE
INSPECTION."
In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah

1993), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Salt Lake
City's motion for summary judgment and a judgment on a jury
verdict for an employee of a contractor that was doing work
for Salt Lake City at the Salt Lake City International
Airport.

That person was injured when an employee of the

City, while in the course of his job duties, as a construction
inspector, inspecting the contractor's work, negligently
pushed a button that activated a large garage-type overhead
door against which the plaintiff's ladder was leaning.

The

opening of the door caused the ladder and the plaintiff to
fall and caused the plaintiff to sustain injuries.

The City

contended that it was immune, under the governmental immunity
"inspection" statute (then codified at Utah Code Ann. §63-30-

12

10(1) (d), contending that its employee's negligent conduct
occurred
at the very core of the inspection process in that (1) he
was attempting to raise a door to make a more thorough
inspection, and (2) it was not an incidental act which
happened to occur during the course of the inspection,
unrelated to the inspection itself.
Id.

at 997.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the City's

employee was acting "as an inspector for the City as the owner
of the property and as a party to the construction project"
{id.)

but stated:
We believe that the legislation intended to preserve a
narrow immunity for inspections to allow inspectors to
perform their work without fear that an oversight which
later causes injury would give rise to liability on the
part of the governmental entity. The conclusions and
results of the inspection are not to be second-guessed by
courts and juries.

Id.

at 998 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court then held, in

part, as follows:
We ... conclude that the immunity granted in section 63-3010(1)(d) was intended to immunize only the conclusions
and results of an inspection where the inspector may have
overlooked something or made a faulty judgment in
deciding whether to approve or reject the subject of the
inspection.
Id.

(emphasis added).
There is nothing in the record of this case to support

the proposition that the University employees were
professional inspectors or the proposition that Ms. Ilott
13

contends that any of them erred "in deciding whether to
approve or reject the subject of the inspection."

The workers

in question were maintenance and repair workers and not
inspection professionals.
Mark Coburn at 9-10

E.g.,

deposition of crew leader

(R. at 160-61).

The instant case is somewhat analogous to Nixon v. Salt
Lake City Corporation, 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995), a case in
which, among other things, the Supreme Court rejected the
City's argument that its "failure to maintain floor scrubbers
[owned by the City] was, at least in part, attributable to
inadequate or negligent inspection as that term is used in
section 63-30-10(4)."

Id.

at 270.

Even in the face of the

fact that "for some period prior to Nixon's injuries, the SLC
employees failed to open the battery cells daily to check the
fluid level in the batteries and failed to test the battery
fluid on a regular schedule with a hydrometer" (id.

at 267),

the Supreme Court held that "as a matter of law, the acts
complained of are acts of maintenance rather than acts of
inspection."

Id.

at 570 (emphasis added).

Nixon court then, id.,

The unanimous

favorably quoted from Ericksen, 858

P.2d at 997:
[T]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable
for the negligent inspection of property most frequently
arises when the entity undertakes inspections to assure
14

compliance with building, fire, electric and other safety
codes.
It is, of course, manifest that nothing of this sort was going
on in connection with the subject work done and not done on
the University's own property.
Just as in Nixon the Supreme Court appropriately focused
on the negligent maintenance of the machines in question and
refused to buy into Salt Lake City's stretch of an argument
that what went on there was a negligent "inspection"
(something apparently not alleged or pursued by Mr. Nixon),
this Court should recognize that the essence of the fault of
the University in this case has nothing to do with the
"inspection" process, per se, but is its negligent failure
satisfactorily to maintain and repair the bleachers or to
address the overall deteriorated condition of the old wooden
bleachers by wholesale replacement.

This Court should,

accordingly, reverse the District Court's grant of summary
judgment.
C.

THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE OWED BY THE UNIVERSITY TO
MS. ILOTT INCLUDED THE DUTY TO WARN, AND THAT DUTY EXISTS
APART FROM "INSPECTION" ANALYSIS.
A pertinent Utah case, given the big picture of this case

and the duty of the University to keep its premises reasonably
safe for business invitees such as Ms. Ilott, and satis15

factorily to warn them2 of dangers attending the use of parts
of its premises, is Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah
31, 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951).

The plaintiff's primary

contention in Erickson was that the premises owner
knew or should have known of the propensities of the
floor to become slippery when wet and was negligent in
failing to warn customers using the entrance way of the
hazard involved or to obviate the slippery condition ....
232 P.2d at 211.
The Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Erickson includes
its instructive and favorable discussion of a jury instruction
given in that case:
With respect to the duty upon [the defendant], the jury
was instructed that ... 'it was the duty of [the defendant]
to exercise reasonable care to keep the entranceway to
its store reasonably safe for the use of its customers;
and in this regard you are instructed that if you shall
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
entranceway was not reasonably safe in that the floor of
the entranceway had become we from rainwater and slick
and slippery and that [the defendant] knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known of said
condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to
remedy said. condition and make said entranceway
reasonably safe for the use of its customers, by means of
warning sig ns to advise of the slick condition or by
covering th e terrazzo entrance with rubber mats or oth<sr
substances to prevent slipping,. then [the defendant] was
negligent.'
Id.

at 212-14 (emphasis added)

2

Please note that there is, unlike the "negligent inspection" provision,
no even arguable governmental immunity defense on which the University can
rely for its failure to warn Ms. Ilott.

16

No development in Utah law since the Erickson case was
decided has detracted from the accuracy of that instruction.
No Utah case vitiates the duty to make safe and/or warn, even
if it is somehow determined that "inspection" analysis is
applicable.

It is nearly indisputable, on the record of this

case, that the premises were not safe and it is entirety
indisputable that the University gave no warning.
University employees understood the risk that persons
walking or running on the bleachers might break the bleachers
and injure themselves (Ratliff depo., at 57 (R. at 142)), but
the University did nothing, by any warnings or by systemically
physically addressing this problem, to address that reality.
Even in the face of the University's knowledge that the
wooden planks would often break when walked upon (e.g., Thomas
depo. at 15 (R. at 152); John depo. at 28-29 (R. at 182-83)),
that they could break when spectators or athletes walked or
ran on them, and that at every game spectators walked on the
bleachers (Thomas depo. at 22 (R. at 153)), the University did
not warn spectators to refrain from walking on the bleachers
{id.;

see, also, John depo. at 22-23 (R. at 178-79)).
This Court should recognize, whatever it does with the

"inspection" versus maintenance/repair/replacement aspect of
this Appeal, that Ms. Ilott's injuries "arise," at least in
17

part, "out of" the University's failure to warn her of the
danger of which the University knew, at least as a matter of
triable fact, to be present in its stadium.

The Court should,

accordingly, reverse the District Court's granting of summary
judgment.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

The Utah Supreme Court long ago, in Glenn v. Gibbons &
Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1954), restated
the general common law rule that a premises owner owes a
business visitor the duty to keep its premises in a condition
that is reasonably safe for the business visitor.

This Court

should keep in mind, as it analyzes the specifics of this
case, the University's general duty to act reasonably to make
and keep its premises safe for Ms. Ilott.

As with nearly all

negligence cases, the question of whether the University
breached its duty to act reasonably is a question of fact to
be resolved, based upon the totality of the circumstances.
A central question for jury determination in this case
will be, unless the District Court on remand grants Ms. Ilott
a directed verdict on the question, whether the condition of
the bleachers in the stadium was such that an unreasonable
risk of harm was present.

The Utah Court of Appeals, in the

premises liability case of Wagoner v. Waterslide, Inc., 744
18

P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1987), addressed that question.

In

Wagoner, the Court held:
The initial issue is whether or not the condition of the
water slide presented an unreasonable risk of harm to
defendant's patrons. Whether an unreasonable risk of
harm existed is a determination of fact to be made by the
jury. AThe standard upon which negligence is gauged is
that of ordinary, reasonable care under the
circumstances, which standard it is peculiarly fitting
that juries determine.' DeWeese v. J.C. Penney, Co., 5
Utah 2d 116, 119, 297 P.2d 898, 901 (1956).
744 P.2d at 1013.
It appears, as suggested hereinabove, that, if the
District Court's analysis is correct, any time a piece of
property owned by a governmental entity is defective or
dangerous and any time there has ever been any "inspection" of
that property by the governmental entity itself, or, indeed, a
total failure of the governmental entity ever to "inspect" the
property, an injured person such as Ms. Ilott will never be
allowed to recover, regardless of the abysmal nature of the
condition, regardless of the abject lack of warnings, and
regardless of how the case is pleaded and developed in
discovery.

Ms. Ilott urges the Court to recognize that that

would be bad public policy, would render Utah Code Ann. §§6330-8 and 63-30-9 essentially meaningless, and cannot be the
law.

19

Ms. Ilott urges the Court to reverse the District Court's
grant of summary judgment and to remand this case for trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2000.

PETER C. COLLINS
TARA L. ISAACSON
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the

of January, 2000,

I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the
foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, LINDA ILOTT by
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Brent A. Burnett
J. Wesley Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Post Office Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA ILOTT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 960906196

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Defendant.

This case came before me for hearing on defendant University
of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 1999.
the matter under advisement.
authorities

cited

by

I then took

Since then, I have examined the legal

counsel

in

support

of

their

respective

positions and considered counsels' oral argument. For the reasons
stated below, I grant defendant's motion based on my conclusion
that the conduct of the defendant claimed to be actionable arose
from an inspection for which the University, as a governmental
entity, is immune from suit.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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The plaintiff alleges that on October 29, 1994, she attended
a football game at Rice Stadium, a facility owned by the defendant.
The plaintiff was returning to her seat when one of the planks used
as bleacher seats in the north end-zone collapsed as she stepped on
it, injuring her.
In

support

of

their

Motion,

the University

Affidavit of Gary Ratliff, who notes that

u

presents

the

[e]ach summer before
s

football season begins, the University does a visual and weight
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in the Rice Stadium."
(Affidavit of Gary Ratliff at para. 1 ) .

The plaintiff contests

Mr. Ratliff's assertion that each of the three planks of every
bleacher

was

visually

or

weight

inspected

by

citing

to

the

deposition testimony of Steven Pyne that he did not have specific
recollection of conducting any inspections and repairs immediately
prior to the October 29, 1994, football game. (Deposition of Steven
Pyne at pp. 32-33).

Mr. Pyne's deposition testimony creates an

issue of fact concerning the scope of the defendant's inspection,
but it is an issue which is rendered
Annotated §63-30-10(4).

ftiirto

immaterial

by Utah Code
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
The

defendant

contends

that

the

governmental

provisions of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-10(4) and
plaintiff's lawsuit.

immunity

(17) bar the

Section 63-30-10(4) provides as follows:

Immunity
from suit of
all
governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee
committed within
the
scope ^ of
employment except if the injury arises out of:

(4) a failure to make an inspection or by
making an inadequate or negligent inspection.
The defendant asserts if its inspection should have disclosed a
defective bleacher, then it is immune under subsection 4 because
the plaintiff's injuries arose out of its "failure to make an
inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection."
In

response

to

the

defendant's

immunity

argument,

the

plaintiff suggests, unfortunately without discussion or analysis,
that paragraph (4) does not apply because her claims do not involve
a failure to inspect or negligent inspection.

After reviewing the

plaintiff's Complaint and the record developed pursuant to the

ftiim
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University's Motion, I am persuaded when the plaintiff's claim that
the University breached its duty to keep Rice Stadium safe and
well-maintained

is coupled

with

the

undisputed

fact

that

the

University conducted regular inspections of the bleacher planks,
inspection immunity bars plaintiff's suit as a matter of law.
The plaintiff herself supplies the primary impetus for my
determination that her claims are subject to inspection immunity in
her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Memorandum").

The legal authority cited by plaintiff as

"most instructive with respect to the issues before this Court" is
quoted with emphasis for the proposition that " [The defendant] was
in the actual possession of the building and had a duty to search
out defects in the premises in order that they be reasonably safe
for the presence of business visitors." Memorandum, at 9,10, citing
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. , 232 P.2d 210
inspections of the bleachers
undertaken

in

clear

(Utah 1951) .

The

conducted by the University

were

recognition

of

the

duty

articulated

in

Erickson. Since the weakened condition of the plank that failed
beneath Ms. Ilott was not apparent, she could only establish the
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University's negligence by proving that a reasonable
would have revealed its true condition.
the plaintiff's

case

is

in

fact

inspection

Accordingly, the crux of

premised

on

the

defendant's

negligent or inadequate inspection.
Having determined that the plaintiff's claims are based on the
theory of negligent inspection, I turn to the question of whether
the defendant's inspection of the bleachers falls within the ambit
of immunity granted under paragraph (4).

The Utah Supreme Court

has addressed the scope of paragraph (4) in two cases: Ericksen v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), and Nixon v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995).

Each of these cases

pares back the application of inspection immunity in different
ways.
In Ericksen, the court decided whether immunity should be
granted

when

the

negligent

conduct

incidental to the actual inspection.
u

complained

of

occurred

The court indicated that

[t]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable for the

negligent inspection of property most frequently arises when the
entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building,
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fire, electric and other safety codes."
Am.Jur.2d Negligence §376 (1989)).

Id. at 997 (citing 57A

The court also noted its belief

that "the legislature intended to preserve a narrow immunity for
inspections to allow inspectors to perform their work without, fear
that an oversight which later causes injury would give rise to
liability on the part of a governmental entity."

Id. at 998.

The

court held

inspection

"was

intended

to

that

immunity related

immunize

only

the

to negligent

conclusions

and

results

of

an

inspection whe>re the inspector may have overlooked something or
made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the
subject of the inspection." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under
Ericksen, the first component of immunity for negligent inspection
is that inspectors who conduct themselves negligently while making
an

inspection

are

not

immunized

-

the

Ericksen

inspector

negligently opened the wrong overhead door while conducting the
inspection of a building under construction dislodging a ladder
which was plciced against the door and injuring the worker who
occupied it -

while inspectors that reach incorrect conclusions

and results from an inspection enjoy immunity.
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In Nixon, court restricted the reach of inspection immunity
by denominating the failure to identify and repair faulty cleaning
equipment as a shortcoming in maintenance and not inspection.

The

court determined that this was not a case "where an inspector
failed

to

determine

that

a

particular

building

or

piece

equipment was unsafe for the public as whole." Id. at 269.

of
In

reaching this decision, the court discussed the genesis of immunity
for negligent inspection as being the "public duty doctrine" which
"'operates to disallow recovery by individuals for such inspections
on the ground that the

[inspection] was intended to protect the

general public, and^to provide a means of enforcing a third-party's
duty

to

repair defects,

rather

than

individual or class of individuals. '"
Negligence §376) (Emphasis added).

to protect

a

particular

Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d

Therefore, while the Ericksen

court reiterated its view that the inspection immunity is to be
parceled out parsimoniously,

it

is properly

invoked where the

inspection is undertaken to safeguard the general public.
Various

rationales

for

the

public

duty

doctrine

exist.

Foremost among them is the notion that the governments interest in

000
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safeguarding the public interest predominates over the interests of
any

one

individual.

Department

The

of Financial

Utah

Supreme

Court

Institutions, 782 P.2d

in

Gillman

506, 513

v.

(Utah

1989) , discussed the reasoning behind the public duty doctrine in
the context of immunity granted in connection with the issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses.
California

Law

Revision

Comm'n,

Reports,

The court quoted 4

Recommendations

Studies 817-18 (1963) :
" x Public entities and public employees should not be
liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to
enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to
inspect persons or property adequately to determine
compliance with health and safety regulations. Nor should
they be liable for negligent or wrongful issuance or
revocation of licenses and permits. The government has
undertaken these activities to insure public health and
safety. To provide the utmost public protection,
governmental entities should not be dissuaded from
engaging in such activities by the fear that liability
may be imposed if an employee performs his duties
inadequately. Moreover, if liability existed for this
type of activity, the risk exposure to which a public
entity would be subject would include virtually all
activities going on within the community. There would be
potential governmental
liability for all
building
defects, for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of
contagious disease. No private person is subjected to
risks of this magnitude.... Far more persons would suffer
if government did not perform these functions at all than
would be benefitted by permitting recovery in those cases
r.fii>R

and
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shown

to

have

performed

Id. at 513.
Pursuant to the analytical model established in Ericksen and
Nixon,

I

conclude

that

the

defendant

components of immunity for inspection.
injuries

stem

from

the

incorrect

has

established

both

First, the plaintiff's

conclusion

reached

by

the

individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers
were safe for the public using Rice Stadium.

In other words, the

plaintiff's injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight
related to the actual inspection process.
public

duty

is

also

met

because

the

The second component of
University's

inspectors

allegedly failed to determine that at least one of the bleachers,
which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it, was unsafe for
public use.

It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers was

undertaken

to

insure

public

health

and

safety.

Since

the

plaintiff's injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and
results of an inspection which was undertaken for the public in
general, the exception to the waiver of immunity found in §63-3010(4) applies to bar the plaintiff's action.
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this / f day of July, 1999.

3^
RONALD E.^NEHRING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this M
July, 1999:

James E. Morton
Attorney for Plaintiff
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Valden P. Livingston
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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